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The purpose of this paper is to determine whether time weighted consensus 
estimates offer a more effective method for predicting company actual EPS 
figures than simple mean or median analysis. The study aims to construct a 
more comprehensive earnings forecast signal using analyst earnings forecasts 
that have been weighted based on the timeliness of updates. Aimed at 
extracting valuable information from timely analyst forecasts, the time weighted 
earnings signal (TWES) methodology allows extracting valuable information 
from analysts who possess some unique insights about the market and issue 
their updates more frequently. One would expect the time signal to reflect a 
more realistic representation of analyst estimate changes and thus be more 
effective in predicting the companies’ reported EPS than the mean and median. 
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INTRODUCTION
Accountants are interested in the production and use 
of financial information. Consequently, a large number 
of accounting and finance studies are concerned about 
whether sophisticated users   of financial data understand 
such information and how they apply this knowledge 
(Bradshaw, 2011). Traditionally, analysts use fundamental 
analysis as an integral part of conducting an evaluation of 
the market environment. The underlying hypothesis of this 
study that fundamental stock analysis reflects a proposition 
that investors tend to buy companies with particular 
characteristics, where these characteristics are reflected 
in fundamental accounting factors, such as earnings per 
share, or EPS. Analysts obtain information by studying public 
records and filings by the company. Financial analysts also 
collect information by participating in public conference calls 
and asking direct questions to the company management as 
well as through small group or one-on-one meetings with 
senior members of management teams. 
The role of financial analysts is to assist their employers 
and/or clients in making successful investment decisions. In 
doing so analysts evaluate company financial statements and 
assess commodity prices, sales, costs, expenses and tax rates 
in order to determine a company’s fair value along with its 
projected future earnings. They also use a range of financial 
ratios calculated from the data obtained from the financial 
statements that helps clients to evaluate the bottom line of 
the company. Usually, as stated by Dunn and Nathan (2005), 
financial analysts generally specialise by sector or industry, 
which allows them to more closely follow recent trends in 
business practices, products, as well as industry competition. 
It is crucial that analysts keep abreast of new regulations or 
policies that may affect the industry, as well as monitor the 
economy to estimate its effect on earnings. 
Research interest in analysts is great as a deeper 
understanding of analysts’ behaviour is of interest to both 
academics concerned with a working framework that 
describes capital markets and practitioners who operate 
in these markets. Investors with limited abilities or time to 
analyse individual securities tend to rely on analysts’ reports. 
Finally, regulators are interested in the flow of information 
that facilitates functional and liquid markets, and analysts are 
critical to this flow of information (Bradshaw, 2011). The 
initial reason investors began examining analysts’ earnings 
forecasts was to gauge their usefulness as a surrogate 
for time-series forecasts in the studies on capital market 
efficiency. Today financial analysts are inherently perceived as 
an interesting economic agent in their own right (Bradshaw, 
2011).
Typically, earnings revision models are formed by a simple 
average of all analyst estimates and this is a well-known 
strategy based on sell-side analyst forecasts. Importantly, the 
aim of this paper is to use appropriate statistical methods 
in order to extract additional information from detailed 
analyst forecasts as they are updated.
The earnings revision signal adopted in this research 
attempts to delve deeper into the detailed analyst forecasts 
to detect early changes in the consensus by combining a 
time weighted earnings signal (TWES) which favours more 
recent revisions. Earnings revisions are an effective signal due 
to the trending nature of analyst revisions and analysts are 
likely to revise in steps in order to reduce reputation risk. 
A change in the consensus earnings estimate will generally 
lead to a share price rise or fall as the market digests the 
information. This in turn leads other analysts in the market 
to re-evaluate their estimates and herd towards the new 
consensus. Earnings revisions are an attempt to detect when 
this trend is underway. This paper attempts to pre-empt the 
earnings revision signal and detect these changes early. We 
therefore take advantage of the existing behavioural biases 
in the earnings revision signal. The hypothesis being that 
older earnings estimates contain less information than the 
more recent earnings estimates. In the other models, when 
following a mean or median approach, analyst earnings 
estimates which have not changed for some time still 
contribute the same weight towards the consensus as more 
recent earnings estimates.
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 
includes a summary of some of the literature that provides 
the background for this study. The data and methodology 
used in the empirical tests are described in Section 3. In 
Section 4 we report the results of the study and draw 
some of the tentative conclusions as to the effectiveness of 
the alternative consensus methodology in forecasting EPS. 
Notably, Section 5 contains robustness tests to support the 
results presented earlier in the paper. Finally, some of the 
concluding remarks and possible future research directions 
are suggested in Section 6 of the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This paper adds to the literature in three major ways. First, as 
a matter of fact, most studies conducted on analyst forecasts 
relate to US firms and only a handful cover the topic of 
analysts’ forecasting in other countries. This study extends 
earlier research on evaluating analysts’ forecasts of EPS for 
firms and does so by including a wide range of Australian 
firms. 
A second contribution of this study is such that it spans 
a large sample period of twelve years, thus providing a 
comprehensive historical coverage of the available data. In 
addition, we include a much larger sample of companies 
than any other previous academic study known to us.  This 
allows us to obtain more reliable and meaningful results 
possibly generalisable to a wide range of other countries. 
Third, in this piece of research we propose a more 
sophisticated methodology for deriving estimated EPS 
figures, as compared to simply relying on a mean or median. 
As mentioned earlier, a fundamental assumption behind 
the mean and/or median approach is that the available 
forecasts impartially reflect the analysts’ private information. 
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However, as evidence suggests, this is not always the case 
(Trueman, 1994). Sometimes analysts choose to release 
earnings forecasts that do not differ greatly from their own 
prior expectations, even though their private information 
justifies the more extreme earnings forecasts. In other 
scenarios, analysts tend to report forecasts similar to those 
previously released by other analysts, even when this is not 
justified by the information they currently possess; that is, 
analysts exhibit herding behaviour (Trueman, 1994). In 
fact, Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) reveal that revisions of 
various forecasters generally move together. These results 
are shown to have interesting empirical implications. This 
therefore goes to suggest that naively calculating a consensus 
analyst forecast by either averaging or alternatively taking 
the median of individual analyst forecasts is inappropriate. 
Not all analysts are characterised by the same level of skills, 
experience and frequency of updates. It is therefore crucial 
to devise a more sophisticated distinguishing technique for 
calculating predicted EPS consensus.   
Behavioural Finance
In 2008–2009, ‘as financial markets responded to the 
economic crisis fuelled by the collapse of subprime mortgage 
backed securities, it appeared that finance theories could 
not explain the vast fluctuations’ in the market (Stefan, 2009, 
p.1). ‘Explanations of the random nature of the stock market 
emerged from the field of behavioural finance, citing panic 
and other investor sentiments as the key factors driving the 
irrational state of the market’ (Stefan, 2009, p.1). Despite the 
emphasis on the EMH in finance, there seems to be increasing 
evidence of substantial anomalies in financial markets. These 
suggest that the underlying principles of rational behaviour 
underpinning the EMH may, in fact, be flawed. Some have 
therefore begun to look into other elements present in 
financial markets, including human behaviour. This has in 
turn prompted the development of what is now known as 
behavioural finance (Dargham, 2009). Behavioural finance 
challenges the efficient markets perspective and focuses 
on how various market participants interpret and act upon 
information readily available to them. 
According to Arnold and Orthman (2011), behavioural 
finance is about the influence of psychology on market 
participants and the subsequent effect thereof on the financial 
markets. The notion behind human behaviour driving the 
markets is not novel (Arnold and Orthman, 2011). Several 
classical economists, including Adam Smith, Irving Fisher 
and John Maynard Keynes emphasised the importance of 
psychological factors in human decision-making, and how 
these factors could change the analysis of economic issues 
(Pech and Milan, 2009). Since then studies appear to confirm 
the significance of the irrational human emotion — a 
phenomenon so widely observed in the markets today and 
which appears to be the key driver of the market. According 
to Sewell (2011, p.1), ‘behavioural finance is the study of 
the influence of psychology on the behaviour of financial 
practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets’. Sewell 
(2011) notes that behavioural finance is of interest because 
it helps to explain why and how markets might be inefficient. 
Importantly, the behavioural finance literature falls into two 
primary areas: the identification of anomalies in the EMH 
that behavioural models may explain (DeBondt and Thaler, 
1985) and the identification of individual investor behaviour 
or bias inconsistent with classical economic theories of 
rational behaviour (Odean, 1999). 
Consistent with the EMH, it is argued that the anomalies 
are chance results; apparent over-reaction to information is 
as common as under-reaction (Sewell, 2011). In particular, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1996, 2000) empirically show 
that people are irrational in a consistent and correlated 
manner. Importantly, Arnold and Orthman (2011, 7 Sep) 
postulate that “a contributor to emotional behaviour” is 
short-termism as (especially when under pressure) humans 
tend to have an inherent preference for short-term activity 
and outcomes”. For example, much of the behavioural 
finance literature is pointing to people having a tendency of 
being over-confident and over-emphasising the importance 
of recent events (Arnold and Orthman, 2011). This can lead 
to analysts using present conditions and recent trends to 
make forecasts, even when they are unlikely to be normal. 
This would effectively result in inaccurate forecasts. Further, 
human liking for immediate gratification might mean that we 
prefer observing positive outcomes sooner rather than later, 
which may cause analysts and investors to track company 
performance in the smallest time segments practicable 
(Arnold and Orthman, 2011). This may, in turn, lead to an 
unrealistic extreme short-term emphasis on performance, 
and as a result, market participants would be likely to 
make decisions based on a short-term fall or gain that is 
unlikely to endure in the longer term (Arnold and Orthman, 
2011). As a result, irrational investors will lose money and 
incompetent analysts will lose their credibility and clientele, 
and as a result, eventually exit the market (Sewell, 2011). 
Advocates of behavioural finance say that market 
inefficiencies are driven by human psychology. Clearly, it 
would be impractical to assume that humans are 100% 
rational 100% of the time. This is particularly evident 
through people’s attitude to risk and the way they assess 
probabilities. Psychologists have observed that when 
making risky decisions, humans are particularly reluctant to 
incur losses. Not surprisingly, most investors and analysts 
do not hold a PhD in probability theory, neither can they 
with absolute certainty predict the future. Therefore, they 
may systematically make errors in assessing the probability 
of uncertain events. Psychologists have found that when 
judging possible future outcomes, individuals tend to look 
back at what happened in a few similar situations and, as a 
result, place too much weight on a small number of recent 
events (Brealey et al, 2008). However, market participants 
of this sort seem to forget how little one can learn about 
the true market conditions purely on the basis of a short-
term glimpse. The tendency to place too much emphasis on 
recent events, and therefore the underlying predisposition 
to overreact to recent news, could explain some of the 
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most abrupt fluctuations in the market. In turn, behavioural 
finance may offer some reasonable explanation of some 
of the puzzles and anomalies surrounding the market. In 
fact, the advocates of behavioural finance suggest that these 
patterns of investor behaviour can explain why markets are 
not always efficient.
Kahneman and Riepe (1998) find that market deviations 
from the maxims of economic rationality are pervasive and 
systematic. So market participants tend to deviate from 
rationality. Further, according to Conlisk (1996), the concept 
of rationality in the context of capital markets is empirically 
very important because ‘there is a mountain of experiments 
in which people may display intransitivity, ignore relevant 
information or use irrelevant information’.  In his book, 
Shiller (2000) explains the irrational behaviour of market 
participants. Importantly, the book was published just before 
the most serious market collapse since the Great Depression 
— the dot.com bubble. Among a number of important 
factors, Shiller (2000) lists analysts’ optimistic forecasts as 
a factor contributing to the irrational exuberance of the 
recent bull market from August 1982 to. Notably, Trammel 
(2006) argues that “theories about rational behaviour are 
conspicuous targets for both practitioners and professors 
of finance”.
Information Advantage of Financial Analysts
In the past couple of decades, financial analysts’ forecasts 
have received increased attention in the finance and 
accounting literature (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979). They 
have been widely used in empirical research to proxy for 
investors’ earnings expectations (Hughes and Ricks, 1987; 
McNichols, 1989). Other empirical research has focused on 
comparing analysts’ forecast accuracy to that of both time-
series and publicly announced managerial forecasts (Brown 
et al, 1987a; Brown and Rozeff, 1978; O’Brien, 1988). An 
implicit assumption underlying much of this research is 
that the forecasts publicly released by analysts reflect their 
private information in an unbiased manner.
Security analysts are a type of financial intermediary whose 
immediate concern is the valuation of assets. Thus, they are 
primarily investment advisors. Because of possible conflicts 
of interest between investors (principals) and corporate 
management (agents), analysts also have a stewardship role 
and may at times serve as corporate critics (De Bondt, 
1991). Security analysts prepare detailed studies of individual 
stocks, make careful comparisons between companies 
(resulting in industry reports), and form expert opinions on 
their likely future earnings and investment performance. At 
the company level, the principal source of information for 
analysts is financial statement analysis. As a rule, they tend to 
access a wide array of information, including security prices, 
firm-specific financial and operating information, industry 
data and macroeconomic factors. As the name itself 
suggests, the value-added activity of the analyst is analysis, 
which encompasses the process through which analysts 
consider a company’s strategy, accounting policies, financial 
performance, future prospects for sales and earnings 
growth, and ultimately a valuation. Based on this, analysts 
draw conclusions in the form of earnings forecasts.  
The abundance of literature on financial analysts ultimately 
points to the difference between the historical academic 
perspective and investor interest in future events (O’Brien, 
1985). The research question addressed by this study is 
motivated by a common academic use of analyst forecast 
data which is as a proxy for the market expectation 
of a firm’s earnings at a given point in time. Accurate 
measurement of earnings expectations is crucial for firm 
valuation, determining cost of capital and understanding 
the relationship between unanticipated earnings and stock 
price changes. Research on financial analysts has developed 
as a by-product of capital markets research focused on 
the correlation between accounting earnings and stock 
prices. In fact, a lot of studies on financial forecasting focus 
on examining the correlation between inputs (prices and 
financial statement information) and outputs (earnings 
forecasts and recommendations) (Fried and Givoly, 1982; 
Brown et al, 1987b). The two methods of estimating 
expected earnings data that are generally used in studies 
of divergent earnings are analysts’ forecasts and time series 
models. 
The interest in tests of market efficiency and value relevance 
of accounting earnings has prompted a significant amount 
of research on time-series modelling of earnings. In this 
respect, Fried and Givoly (1982) are often given credit as 
their research supports the conclusion that analysts are 
a better proxy for expected earnings than time-series 
models. On one hand, as noted by Brown et al (1987a), if 
analysts are efficient in any sense, it has to be the case that 
analysts’ forecasts are more accurate than time-series model 
forecasts, because analysts have both the timing and the 
information advantages. In this regard, Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) observe that market prices cannot fully reflect all 
available information; otherwise, information gatherers like 
security analysts would not be rewarded for their costly 
activities. One would assume that analysts can easily obtain 
a time-series model and incorporate that information into 
their overall information set (Bradshaw, 2011).
The rational expectations hypothesis suggests that market 
earnings expectations should be measured by the best 
available earnings forecasts (Brown and Rozeff, 1978). 
Meanwhile, both basic economic theory and the equilibrium 
employment of analysts imply that being a higher cost than 
time series models, analysts must produce better forecasts 
(Brown and Rozeff, 1978). Since security analysts process 
substantially more data than the time series of past earnings, 
their earnings forecasts should be superior to time series 
forecasts and provide better measures of market earnings 
expectations. Aggregate analyst earnings forecasts have been 
found to be more accurate than forecasts from time-series 
models in numerous studies (Fried and Givoly, 1982; Brown 
and Rozeff, 1978; Brown et al, 1987a; Philbrick and Ricks, 
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1991). In that regard, Brown et al (1987a) agree with the 
rest of the literature but point out that even though analysts’ 
forecasts are more reliable than time-series forecasts, the 
prediction errors are large in both cases. In this paper, we 
aim to present a method allowing one to achieve a smaller 
prediction error than that derived from the widely available 
generic consensus measures. 
Earnings Per Share
According to Schallke (1962, p.670), the “concept of income 
constitutes a controversial and complex part of accounting 
theory, being an area which has important implications for 
practice”. It is an essential characteristic of our economy that 
results often do not accord with expectations. Any plan, no 
matter how well conceived, can be disrupted by unforeseen 
events and circumstances. Thus, plans are made and the 
economy moves on the basis of expectations, but actual 
results may differ from the predicted ones (Schallke, 1962, 
p.670). As said by a well-known economist Adam Smith, it is 
expectations which are controlling, rather than results. From 
this follows the significance of ex ante, or expected income 
in the eyes of economists. One important feature is the fact 
that ex ante calculations are not irrevocable as they can be 
revised and changed from time to time in order to conform 
to actual conditions (Schallke, 1962, p.671).
Inevitably, the subject of forecasting financial variables has 
received wide attention in the last few decades (Crichfield 
et al, 1978). In fact, “continuing effort is being directed 
toward the improvement of accounting practices in order 
to present more meaningful financial statements” (Axelson, 
1975, p.43). Expected income is a valuable tool in predicting 
the direction of a firm, an industry, and taken collectively, 
the economy. In terms of its impact on capital markets, 
empirically the annual earnings number is the single most 
important piece of information that the firm releases 
(Brown et al, 1985). Similarly, according to Richards (1976), 
the most common security valuation technique employed 
today involves an expected future earnings figure which is 
capitalised at an appropriate rate (multiplier) to provide an 
expected future price for a security. As said by Francis (1972), 
the true economic value of the firm depends on its earnings 
prospects, in light of anticipated economic conditions. There 
has been growing concern by both the regulators and the 
private investment community over the earnings forecasts 
which are the basis of these valuation models. 
According to Axelson (1975, p.42), “the two numbers most 
used by equity investors today are earnings per share and 
the price-to-earnings ratio”, which are essentially the inverse 
of each other. As Axelson (1975, p.42), further highlights, 
“trends in these two numbers are carefully analysed, and 
predictions of future trends often play a decisive role in 
investment decisions”. These numbers are important tools 
enabling one to quantify the evaluation of investment 
value (Axelson, 1975). In fact, the earnings per share figure 
serves as a common language for describing the securities 
of different companies (Axelson, 1975). It seems that this 
figure is so widely followed that small changes in the trend 
of earnings can have an immediate and significant impact on 
the market value of securities. 
The overwhelming mass of detail that ends up being 
published in annual reports is often so technical that it 
ultimately tends to confuse rather than clarify the company’s 
performance for individual investors (Axelson, 1975). 
Forecasts are currently available from professional security 
analysts and from company management. In addition, recent 
growth in detailed disclosure has increased the interest 
in simplistic measures of investment value and, as a result, 
placed even greater reliance on such accounting measure of 
performance as EPS (Axelson, 1975). An extensive body of 
literature has examined the information content of earnings. 
In fact, Givoly and Lakonishok (1979, p.165) find that financial 
analysts’ forecast revisions convey or reflect information. 
Furthermore, the authors provide evidence to suggest that 
the “information on revisions in forecasts of EPS is valuable 
to investors”. According to Crichfield et al (1978, p.652), 
“an implied purpose of EPS forecasts provided by security 
analysts is to yield unbiased estimates of future earnings per 
share which would be useful for investors in assessing firms’ 
equilibrium values”.  
Analysts and the Agency Problem
Following the development and increasing accessibility of 
databases containing analysts’ EPS forecasts, many studies 
have analysed their quality. An implicit assumption underlying 
much of this research is that the forecasts publicly released 
by analysts reflect their private information in an unbiased 
manner. In contrast, numerous studies document that analysts’ 
forecasts of earnings, on average, exhibit over-optimism 
and end up being too high (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; 
Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; McDonald, 1973; Barefield 
and Comiskey, 1975; Fried and Givoly, 1982; Stickel, 1990; 
Lys and Sohn, 1990). A panel of previous researchers has 
documented that analyst forecasts are optimistically biased 
(O’Brien, 1988; Butler and Lang, 1991; Philbrick and Ricks, 
1991; Abarbanell, 1991). 
In a study of whether security analysts overreact, De 
Bondt and Thaler (1990) found that analysts’ forecasts are 
prone to be too optimistic and too extreme. The authors 
concluded that analysts over-react to past earnings changes, 
resulting in forecasts that are over-optimistic. De Bondt and 
Thaler (1990) provide evidence to suggest that analysts’ 
earnings forecasts are indeed consistent with “generalised 
overreaction”. Specifically, the authors show that earnings 
changes forecasted by analysts are significantly more 
extreme than actual realisations, and conclude that the 
forecasts seem too extreme to be considered rational (De 
Bondt and Thaler, 1990). Naturally, the optimism bias may 
simply reflect an economic incentive to encourage trading. 
Alternatively, the bias may be due to pressure from company 
management. Importantly, the overreaction bias is more 
severe for long-term forecasts (Graham, 1959). Further, in 
their investigation of earnings forecasts for 100 companies, 
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Barefield and Comiskey (1975) concluded that forecast 
earnings have exceeded actual earnings in 64% of the cases 
(Barefield and Comiskey, 1975). The study by Jaggi and Jain 
(1998) shows that, on an overall basis, analyst forecasts are 
generally biased towards overstatement. 
Importantly, we acknowledge the apparently disparate 
conclusions in the literature  (Abarbanell and Bernard, 
1992). In particular, studies involving earnings forecasts that 
are not consistent with the apparently persistent optimistic 
bias include Theil (1966), Lys and Sohn (1990), Abarbanell 
(1991), Easterwood and Nutt (1999) as well as Lys and 
Sohn (1990) who found that analysts’ forecasts underreact 
to information in issuing financial forecasts. Similarly, Brown 
and Rozeff (1978), Fried and Givoly (1982), Brown et al 
(1985 and 1987), O’Brien (1988) and Brown et al (1985) 
also found that analysts underestimate actual EPS. Notably, 
Theil (1966, p.14), states that “generally speaking, forecasters 
tend to underestimate changes more frequently than they 
overestimate them.”
Overall, there does not appear to be consensus in the 
financial literature on whether analysts over- or under-react 
to information. Thus, it could be argued that analysts tend 
to be fairly inefficient in processing numerous pieces of 
information. Such evidence of inefficient analysts’ earnings 
forecasts by DeBondt and Thaler (1990) and Mendehall 
(1991) raises an overall question of analysts’ forecast 
reliability. 
Analysts’ Forecast Reliability
Analyst forecasting accuracy is of importance not only to 
investors willing to invest in those stocks, but also to the 
underlying companies themselves. If the estimates for a 
particular company are not accurate, this would affect that 
stock’s liquidity, as not many investors would be willing to 
trade in such stocks. Essentially, the association between 
security returns and analyst forecast revisions suggests that 
investors extract relevant information about upcoming 
earnings from analyst forecasts. Unsurprisingly, a vast 
majority of research on analysts is focused on their ability 
to forecast earnings (Clement and Tse, 2005; Mikhail et al, 
1987). Existing research indicates that the most important 
trait valued by institutional investors is industry knowledge, 
which explains why most analysts specialise by industry. 
Clearly, analysts are valued for their ability to see individual 
companies within the context of the industry. As Mikhail et 
al (1987) highlight, individual analyst experience increases 
forecast accuracy. According to Clement and Tse (2005), the 
likelihood of analyst earnings forecasts increases with the 
analyst’s prior accuracy and experience, and declines with 
the number of industries the analyst follows. 
An implicit assumption behind much of the empirical 
research involving security analyst earnings forecasts is such 
that these forecasts reflect the analysts’ private information 
in an unbiased manner. However, Trueman (1994) shows 
that this much desired assumption may not necessarily 
be valid. In this regard, Clement and Tse (2005) classify 
forecasts as bold if they are away from both the analyst’s 
own prior forecast and the consensus forecast or below 
both. The authors classify all other forecasts that move 
away from the analyst’s own prior forecast and toward the 
consensus as herding forecasts. Clement and Tse (2005) 
find that bold forecasts are on average more accurate than 
herding forecasts, as bold forecasts incorporate analysts’ 
private information and are more informative to investors 
than herding forecasts. Herding happens when analysts 
revise their forecasts simply to be closer to the consensus 
forecast, or other analysts, or both and not because of new 
private information (Clement and Tse, 2005; Gleason and 
Lee, 2003). In fact, Givoly and Lakonishok (1979, p.171) 
“reveal that revisions of various forecasters do generally 
move together”. These results are shown to have interesting 
empirical implications. In related research, Trueman (1990) 
shows that, upon obtaining new information, analysts may 
also be reluctant to revise previously issued forecasts. This is 
because a forecast revision would signal to the market that 
the analyst’s original information was inaccurate, which as a 
result may lower the perceived assessment of the analyst’s 
forecasting ability. This therefore goes to suggest that 
naively calculating a consensus analyst forecast by averaging 
individual analyst forecasts is inappropriate.
An interesting artefact in regard to herding is the persistent 
trending in forecast earnings revisions. Upward revisions tend 
to be followed by additional revisions in the same direction, 
and the same is true for downgrades. For example, when 
analysts first raise their forecasts for a stock, some investors 
will buy and the price will rise. When secondary analysts 
follow, there will be more buying and a further price rise. 
As stated by Jacobs and Levy (1989, p.6), “this persistence 
of estimate revisions leads to persistence” in market moves. 
The reasoning behind trending in forecast earnings revisions 
is addressed next. 
First, due to credibility concerns, individual analysts tend 
to be averse to forecast reversals, especially when their 
current view differs from consensus. Suppose an analyst had 
been forecasting $2 of earnings per share, but now believes 
the best estimate to be $1. Rather than admitting to a 
bad forecast, the analyst will be motivated to reduce the 
forecast in smaller increments. Second, analysts who suffer 
from conservatism do not adjust their earnings forecasts 
sufficiently in response to new information contained in 
earnings announcements. Third and important, analysts 
are more concerned about how accurate their forecast 
is relative to other analysts, rather than how close their 
individual forecast is to reality. Thus, revising their forecast 
to a more conservative number will ensure that all upside 
will be captured if the information is correct, without losing 
much credibility if the information is wrong. 
Relating analysts’ tendency to herd to their experience, 
Hong et al (2000) find that more experienced analysts are 
less likely to herd. Similarly, research finds that analysts issuing 
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bold forecasts are on average employed by large brokerages, 
issue more frequent forecasts, and have greater firm-specific 
and general experience (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Trueman, 
1994; Clement, 1999). In contrast, analysts issuing herding 
forecasts tend to cover more companies and industries. 
Consistent with empirical evidence, Hong et al (2000), 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Stickel (1990) find that 
experienced analysts are more likely to issue bold forecasts 
than their less experienced colleagues. In particular, Trueman 
(1994) proposes that herding declines with the analyst’s 
experience. This suggests that inexperienced analysts are 
less likely to provide extreme forecasts and tend to herd 
more frequently. In turn, investors view bold forecasts as 
more informative than the more generic herding forecasts. 
As it became generally accepted that analysts have status 
of an important economic agent in the capital markets, 
academics became interested in a deeper understanding of 
analysts’ forecasts and their underlying reliability. Forecasting 
company earnings is difficult but very important (De Bondt, 
1991). Numerous studies examine the differences between 
actual and expected or divergent earnings (Doran, 2000; 
Brown and Rozeff, 1978; Fried and Givoly, 1982; Brown et 
al, 1987b; Phibrick and Ricks, 1991; Barelield and Comiskey, 
1975; Basi et al, 1976; Crichfield et al, 1978). The study 
by Lui (1992) evaluates the ability of security analysts to 
forecast the EPS for firms in Hong Kong and concludes that 
analysts’ forecasts are significantly biased and inaccurate. The 
study by McDonald (1973) provides additional empirical 
information on the reliability of earnings predictions. 
Reliability was examined by comparing predicted earnings 
with actual earnings for the same period. Reliability in this 
study was based on the degree of agreement between 
predicted earnings and actual earnings. Therefore, reliability 
was not used by McDonald (1973) in the sense of declaring 
predicted earnings reliable or unreliable, but was used in the 
sense of the degree of closeness to being right.
 
Earnings forecasts by professionals are generally believed 
to be valuable information and their accuracy is a matter 
of concern to a wide range of market participants. The 
primary use of analyst earnings forecasts in academic work 
is to provide a proxy for the market expectation of a future 
earnings realisation (O’Brien 1985). Forecast aggregations, 
such as the mean or median, are often used for this purpose. 
These proxies, however, assume that analysts have identical 
forecasting abilities, so the identity of the individual analyst is 
ignored in defining the consensus (O’Brien, 1985). However, 
if some analysts produce consistently superior or inferior 
forecasts, then such knowledge can be used to improve the 
accuracy of the consensus measure. If analysts update at 
different times and do not differ in their forecasting ability, 
then under mild assumptions the most recent forecast 
available may be more meaningful. However, if analysts differ 
systematically in forecasting ability, there will be a trade-
off between the age of the forecast and the ability of the 
forecaster (O’Brien, 1985).
Existing research shows that forecast accuracy generally 
improves as the forecasting horizon decreases (Brown et 
al, 1985; O’Brien, 1988 and 1990). So if analyst forecasts 
are non-synchronous, then the more recent forecasts may 
incorporate more information and should be more accurate 
than their out-dated precedents (O’Brien 1985). If the 
older forecasts are simply irrelevant, then discarding them 
is appropriate (O’Brien, 1985). Thus, it would flow that the 
longer the forecast horizon, the greater the disagreement 
among security analysts in their earnings forecasts (Lui, 
1992). This is reasonable because the more distant the future 
the more difficult it is to make accurate forecasts. Jaggi and 
Jain (1998) also show that analyst forecasts with shorter 
time horizons are more accurate than forecasts with longer 
time horizons. Another interesting factor possibly affecting 
the outcome of our research is the notion that forecast age 
varies in significance from sector to sector. Moreover, prior 
literature suggests that analysts’ forecasts become more 
accurate as the reporting date is approaching thus further 
pointing to the increasing forecast accuracy with time. 
Data and Methodology
Data
The data used in this study includes primary earnings 
per share (EPS) before extraordinary items, and where 
necessary, these EPS figures have been adjusted for stock 
splits and dividends. To calculate basic EPS, the company’s 
net income is divided by the number of shares outstanding 
. We empirically test which one of the following consensus 
estimates is the closest predictor of company actual EPS 
figures: mean, median, or the time weighted consensus. In 
pursuit of the more effective consensus estimates, we use 
longitudinal time series daily individual analyst reports for 
12financial years covering 2000 to 2011. We are concerned 
with the performance of security analysts over a relatively 
long period of time. This differs from most published studies 
of forecasts which deal with a smaller number of years . 
The original dataset for each country comprises 1121 
Australian companies for 12 years from 2000 to 2011. The 
average number of analysts per company is 5.31 (mean) 
and 4.45 (median). “The number of forecasts per company 
varies considerably and, in general, is a positive function of 
the size and investment interest” (Barefield and Comiskey, 
1975, p.242). This study covers Australia for 12 years and 
we believe this provides a good testing ground for a more 
advanced EPS forecast signal. The data for the purpose of this 
research came from the Thompson Reuters database. The 
testing sample of companies is limited to stocks covered by 
a minimum of three analysts. It is assumed that updates by 
at least three analysts are required to provide a reasonable 
consensus. 
Methodology
Analysts provide various forecast estimates for listed 
companies. One would expect that these estimates will differ 
as each analyst holds differing outlooks and assumptions 
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about the company. These individual forecasts are often 
aggregated to form a market consensus for each company. 
Traditional earnings revision models measure changes in 
the equal weighted average consensus of analyst estimates 
over time. Thus, the standard earnings consensus is formed 
from an equally weighted consensus of all the latest analyst 
estimates. However, not all estimates are equal. To improve 
on the standard earnings revision models, we adjust the 
individual analyst estimates to form the time weighted 
earnings signal (TWES) by placing a greater weighting on 
the more recent forecasts. With the aim of extracting extra 
information from the analyst forecasts, this measure aims 
to enhance the reliability of analyst consensus estimates of 
company EPS. 
Increased interest in corporate earnings forecasts has 
encouraged the flow of forecast information from a variety 
of sources. A primary problem encountered in the use of 
this information is determining who among the forecasters 
is a better performer. In situations where multiple forecasts 
are available for a given corporation, investors have a choice 
of strategies. One such strategy would be to use the mean of 
all available forecasts. At the other extreme, investors could 
try to determine which of the forecasts is most reliable and 
only use that one. The purpose of this paper is to detect 
which one of the following techniques – mean, median, or 
time weighted – consensus estimate offers the most reliable 
method for predicting company actual EPS figures. 
The study focuses on the more comprehensive earnings 
forecast signal using analyst earnings forecasts to detect early 
changes in analysts’ revisions. To extract valuable information 
from timely analyst forecasts, the time signal methodology 
allows delving deeper into the analyst forecasts to detect early 
changes in the consensus signal and produce a robust time 
weighted earnings estimate. In particular, the study examines 
the effectiveness of analyst earnings forecasts that have been 
weighted based on a time period of 100 days. Spanning over 
12 years from 2000 to 2011, the mean time that an average 
analyst takes to update their EPS forecast estimate is 91 
days. With the mean being 91 days and considering that one 
would expect some leeway for earnings updates by analysts, 
we believe that adopting the 100 day “cut-off ” benchmark 
is a reasonable assumption. Notably, the average number of 
days required by an analyst to issue a new forecast was 95 
days in the first half of the tested period, spanning from 2000 
to 2005, it then decreased to 84 days in the second half of 
the tested period, lasting from 2006 to 2011. We therefore 
observe a decline in the number of days it takes an analyst 
to update their forecast, when moving from the first half of 
observations to the second. Possible explanations for this 
could be technological advances, increased media coverage 
and greater data availability. 
One would expect the time signal to reflect a more realistic 
representation of analyst estimate changes and thus be 
more effective in predicting company reported EPS than 
the mean and median-based consensus. Considering that FE 
is a forecast error, the two hypotheses laid out in the paper 
are described below. They postulate that time-weighted 
consensus estimates are a more robust alternative to mean 
and median consensus figures.
(1) H0 :  FE Time weighted   ≤   FE Mean     
 H1 :  FE Time weighted   >   FE Mean;
(2) H0 :  FE Time weighted   ≤  FE Median     
 H1 :  FE Time weighted   >  FE Median;
The focus of the study is on quantitative data analysis 
techniques. The paper investigates the field of security 
analysis where the main emphasis is on the quantifiable 
aspects of the stock screening process, while attempting 
to minimise the importance of the more qualitative factors 
of corporate performance. Accordingly, a combination 
of empirical studies and statistical analysis tools will be 
implemented as the principal methodologies for conducting 
this research. 
Effectively, this paper builds on research on the time 
and directional signal in Australia. The study presents an 
analysis of 11 sectors: Basic Materials, Capital Goods, 
Cyclical, Energy, Financials, Health, Non-Cyclical, Services, 
Technology, Transport and Utilities.  Table 1 provides a 
sector composition by the number of companies per 
sector. The sectors considered in this study are categorised 
using the Thomson Reuters methodology known as the 
Reuters Business Sector Schema (RBSS). Notably, RBSS is 
a classification system designed to track and display the 
primary business of a corporation and grouping highly 
related products and services into a single industry category. 
Appendix A elaborates on the sector classification by 
industry to provide a better understanding of the range of 
companies belonging to each sector.
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Table 1.  Sector Composition by the Number of Companies Per Sector
Sector No of Companies
Basic Materials 239
Capital Goods 82
Cyclical 24
Energy 116
Financials 101
Health 86
Non-Cyclical 48
Services 305
Technology 79
Transport 20
Utilities 21
TOTAL 1121
Methods
In constructing the time weighted earnings signal (TWES), the idea is to place more weight on the more recent earnings 
estimates. The rationale for adopting the time weighting method in the study is that the most recent revisions are more 
reflective of where the market sees the stocks. For different reasons, not all analysts are as timely in updating their forecasts. 
Time weighting may also act as a data cleaning exercise for stocks where the analyst has left their brokerage firm or dropped 
coverage. One would assume that the average time between analysts updating their estimates varies throughout the year and 
can be different depending on the size of the company and its geographical location. In constructing the time weighted EPS 
signal, the weights of analyst forecasts are based on the amount of time that has passed since the analyst has last changed their 
forecasts. Fig. 1 is an illustration of this process.
Figure I.   Time-weighted Consensus Signal with the Application of a Linear Weighting Scale
Weight
Age of Estimate
A linear time period going back 100 days is used. For example, if an analyst revised today, their EPS forecast receives a weight 
of one; if an analyst last revision was 100 days ago, they receive zero weight; if analyst revised 50 days ago, they receive half 
weight etc.  Appendix B provides more insight into how the time-weighted measures are calculated.
Forecasting is one useful means for estimating the values of important variables under uncertainty. A forecast, or prediction, is 
simply a statement about an unknown event and typically, as appears in our case, they are future events. In the present study, 
we are concerned with security analyst predictions of EPS figures for major corporations. There is likely to be some sample 
bias due to the limited coverage of firms by companies providing forecast data. This bias is toward a greater coverage of large 
and somewhat more mature firms that likely have had a sufficient number of analysts covering them. For this reason, any 
conclusions to different populations should be made with care. We will evaluate the accuracy of these forecasts as compared 
to predictions from alternative statistical models in terms of the magnitude of the forecast error.
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The time period selected for this study is for years 2000 
through to 2011. This time frame exhibits differing economic 
conditions, which aids in making the results of the study 
more generalisable. As part of data requirements, only 
companies covered by at least three analysts are included in 
the study. Importantly, a similar parameter is adopted by Lui 
(1992). Thus, the analysis begins from the date when there 
are at least three analysts until the day when the company 
announces its end of financial year results.  
The accuracy of forecasts in this study is examined by using 
the forecast error measures to reflect the difference between 
forecast and actual values of EPS. To measure the accuracy 
of forecasts on an average basis, the absolute forecast error 
measure is used, which is deflated by an absolute amount of 
actual values. Therefore, the forecast error is defined as the 
absolute value of the percentage difference between actual 
and forecasted earnings, such that:
FE% = (Fcons− A) /A
where A is the actual EPS, and F
cons
 is the EPS consensus 
forecast.
To account for the effect that some of the extreme 
observations would have on the summary statistics, we 
adjust the data for outliers. Accordingly, observations with 
absolute forecast errors above 100% are removed from the 
analysis. Similarly, in discussing the research design of their 
study, Jaggi and Jain (1998) and Foster (1986) argue that 
firms with forecast errors over 200% should be dropped 
from further analysis.  
Importantly, standard statistical tools invariably require the 
successive elements in any summation to be independent. 
This assumption, however, is unrealistic if the forecast errors 
are measured in terms of levels of EPS. As the level of EPS 
increases in absolute magnitude, we should likewise expect 
analysts’ forecast errors to increase in absolute magnitude. 
In a cross-sectional sense, performance measures which 
evaluate differences between the levels of forecast EPS and 
the levels of actual EPS would be biased against firms with 
high absolute levels of EPS and biased in favour of firms 
with low absolute levels of EPS. This would make empirical 
results based upon such measures difficult to interpret. Thus, 
to avoid asymmetry problems, we chose to work in terms 
of percentage changes in EPS. If one does not use absolute 
values for both the numerator and the denominator, then 
the use of this measurement scheme produces a positive 
number for over-predictions and a negative number for 
under-predictions. This can be seen in McDonald (1973) 
who refers to the forecast error as the ‘relative prediction 
error’, defined as FE% = [A−F] / F . 
According to Doran (2000, p.125), “divergent earnings are 
those that differ from expected”. Divergent earnings (DE) 
is the undeflated measure where DE = A – F, and DE% is 
divergent earnings deflated by the absolute value of the 
EPS forecast, where DE% = [A−F] / F (Doran, 2000). 
Studies that scrutinise divergent earnings (or forecast error) 
commonly employ the methodology of deflating divergent 
earnings measures (Brown and Kim, 1991; Bowen et al, 1992; 
Doran, 1995). This indicates that the common practice of 
deflating earnings data is necessary. As explained above, we 
believe that the need to use deflated and absolute values 
in determining the forecast error across a large sample of 
companies with varying levels of EPS.    
The ultimate question the study attempts to address is 
whether alternative consensus methodology is superior to 
the usual mean and median scenario so widely adopted in 
the financial industry, but learning about the different results 
on a sector basis as well as analysing year-by-year variations 
in the countries’ economic cycles would provide the reader 
with a deeper understanding of the results obtained from 
the study. 
RESULTS
In this section we examine whether the time weighted 
consensus estimates provide a better alternative to the 
mean and median consensus estimates. Reflecting on the 
methodology section, technically, there is a scale problem 
in measuring analysts’ forecast errors when using the data 
measured in its level form. This problem can persist across 
firms and over time. So a firm with the same total earnings 
as another but half as many shares outstanding will have 
an EPS that is twice as large. To adjust for differences in 
the magnitude of EPS and forecast errors across firms, it 
is necessary to use a deflator, such as dividing the forecast 
error by the actual value. 
In applying the parameters described in the methodology 
section, by including only stocks covered by at least 
three analysts and removing the outliers whose absolute 
percentage error exceeds 100%, we find that the number of 
companies decreases by 40%, from 1121 to 668. 
In using the t-test in the context of larger samples involving 
50 or more observations, the distribution is approximately 
normal. To further strengthen the results of the study, we 
test the statistical significance of the differences using the 
paired t-test method. As the t-statistic in all cases was 
greater than 2, we can conclude that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the variables observed.  
In using a linear time period going back 100 days and placing 
greater weight on the more recent analyst EPS forecast 
estimates, the results of the study indicate that on average, 
the 100 day time weighted consensus measure (from now 
on we shall refer to it as the 100 day TWES) is superior to 
both median and mean. In fact, across all the years studied, 
the 100 day TWES ranks as the number one consensus 
approach (average FE = 24.3%), followed by the median 
(average FE = 25.9%), and the mean (average FE = 28.0%) 
which ranks as the least accurate technique for calculating 
consensus.
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Overall on a sector basis, the 100 day TWES (average FE = 24.3%) acts as the closest predictor of company EPS in all sectors. 
The only exception is Utilities where the median is the most reliable prediction method of corporate earnings (average FE = 
22.4%), followed closely by the mean (average FE = 22.6%) and the 100 day TWES (average FE = 22.4%) comes last (average 
FE = 24.4%). In this one case, it is the median that acts as a better proxy of reported EPS than the 100 day TWES. The utilities 
sector has a very small number of companies, thus reducing the significance of this result. Table 2 below summarises these 
findings.   
 
Table 2.  Time-Weighted Consensus Results By Sector
Sector Number of  
Companies
Mean Median 100 Day
TWES
Basic Materials 116 38.3% 33.7% 32.1%
Capital Goods 54 24.1% 23.6% 21.1%
Cyclical 12 29.7% 26.9% 24.5%
Energy 65 38.7% 36.7% 33.7%
Financials 63 22.6% 22.1% 21.2%
Health 35 29.1% 26.2% 24.5%
Non-Cyclical 38 24.7% 23.2% 22.0%
Service 219 22.5% 20.9% 19.2%
Technology 34 26.9% 22.6% 22.3%
Transport 16 32.1% 32.9% 32.0%
Utilities 16 22.6% 22.4% 24.4%
Total/Average 668 28.3% 26.5% 25.2%
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
To strengthen our research results, we performed a number 
of additional tests. Our aim was to make sure that the time 
weighted methodology is superior to simple benchmarks 
such as mean or median regardless of the chosen cut-off 
age of the estimate. To add to the 100 day benchmark 
established throughout the study, we also ran tests where 
the maximum age of the estimate was 50 and 150 days. 
Such tests supported our earlier proposition that the time 
weighted methodology was in fact a more reliable predictor 
of the actual EPS than simple arithmetic benchmarks. 
Interestingly, the statistical differences between the 50, 100 
and 150 day results are not significant. 
In addition to testing the linear model with the time period 
going back 100 days, we also tested a number of exponential 
models. The robustness tests based on the exponential 
models tended to support the superiority of the time 
weighted approach over the mean and median method but 
did not result in lower forecast errors. We thus conclude 
that using the linear time weighted consensus model allows 
the achievement of a more reliable consensus overall than 
that derived from the exponential time weighted consensus 
models.   
Interestingly, Clement and Tse (2005) found that analysts 
have difficulty forecasting earnings for firms that are 
currently reporting losses. To further strengthen our results, 
we examined the potential effects of some of the major 
economic turmoils of the 21stcentury, such as the GFC 
of 2008-2009 and the dot.com bubble of 2000-2001, on 
the forecasting accuracy and the magnitude of the forecast 
error. Not surprisingly, the results of the study show that in 
2000 as well as 2008-2009, the percentage forecast error 
was higher than in other years. A valuable conclusion for 
our study here is that despite the variations in the size of 
the forecast error and in spite of the different economic 
regimes around, the 100 day TWES (average FE = 23.9%) 
continues to provide robust consensus methodology, and 
in fact outperforms the median (average FE = 26.0%) and 
mean average (FE = 28.0%) throughout the twelve-year 
period considered in the study.
It has been well documented in the finance literature that 
in times of economic downturns when EPS tends to be 
negative, analysts’ forecast errors become larger than under 
the business-as-usual scenario. Continuing from the previous 
findings, we make an attempt to ensure that the time 
weighted methodology remains a more reliable alternative 
to the mean and median methods at times when EPS is 
negative and go on to conduct some additional testing. The 
results show that 132 companies out of the original 1121 
firms have cases when an EPS is negative. When this is the 
case, the consensus forecast errors tend to sky-rocket, with 
the mean showing an average FE of 52.6%, median average 
FE = 46.4% and the 100 day TWES reaching an average FE 
of 44.1%.   
 
Such empirical evidence goes to suggest two things when 
EPS is negative. First, the time weighted methodology 
continues to be a more reliable alternative to the mean and 
median methods. The second finding is such that analysts’ 
forecast errors are significantly larger when earnings are 
negative. In fact, in times of significant economic hardships, 
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the 100 day TWES forecast error is significantly lower than 
the forecast error derived from the mean or median. 
The robustness tests performed provide evidence in favour 
of the superiority of the time weighted consensus method 
over the mean and the median consensus approach. This 
outcome holds true across most sectors and financial years, 
as well as during the times of economic downturns, such as 
the GFC or the dot.com bubble, for example. This supports 
the results presented earlier in the paper.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Security analysts play an important role in capital markets. 
As information intermediaries, they provide quantitative 
outputs for investors in the form of earnings forecasts. 
Believed to be the proxy of rational expectations, analysts’ 
forecasts of firms’ earnings and the related forecast errors 
are issues widely discussed in finance and accounting 
literature. By underlining the critical role of estimated 
earnings in stock valuation, research suggests that analyst 
earnings forecast revisions convey significant information to 
the market. In fact, earnings forecast accuracy is described 
by the Institutional Investor and the Wall Street Journal as 
the determining quality of top-ranked analysts. Importantly, 
as highlighted by Schipper (1991), an accurate earnings 
forecast is not merely an end in itself but a tool to gauge the 
investment potential of a company’s stock. 
Importantly, the timeliness of the forecasts and forecast 
accuracy are an interesting trade-off faced by analysts 
who issue forecasts. They need to choose between either 
promptly releasing forecasts with respect to new information 
or waiting in order to produce more accurate forecasts at 
some point in the future by obtaining additional information. 
In this paper we examine the analysts forecast error, defined 
as the difference between actual and forecast earnings. We 
compare whether – in measuring the forecast error – the 
time weighted consensus methodology based on a 100-day 
time window is superior to the mean and median consensus 
approach. As the results of the study demonstrate, across 
the Asia-Pacific region, the time weighted consensus signal 
seems to be a more accurate and reliable measure in 
forecasting company EPS. This result is true across sectors 
as well as throughout different time periods and varying 
economic conditions. We may therefore conclude that in 
Asia-Pacific, the time weighted forecast EPS signal tends 
to exhibit valuable predictive properties. Such evidence 
is consistent with our earlier proposition that naively 
calculating analyst forecast consensus by averaging individual 
analyst forecasts is, to say the least, inappropriate. Not all 
analysts are the same; in fact they are characterised by a 
varying level of skills, experience, coverage and frequency of 
updates. Thus, proposing a more sophisticated technique for 
calculating EPS consensus estimates is crucial.   
As the topic of analysts’ forecasts is rather vast, there are 
a number of areas for further research. We outline some 
possible future research directions below. As noted by 
Barefield and Comiskey (1975), little research effort has 
been directed to either the nature or the role of analysts’ 
forecasts of EPS, although such forecasts seem to be a 
key element in the formulation of investment decisions. 
Additional research efforts could focus on a variety of issues 
related to earnings forecasts. Although the time weighting 
approach seems to be an effective proxy for conviction in 
analyst views, a number of other analyst variables could also 
be explored and include the following. 
First, it would be meaningful to construct consensus made 
up of the most active forecasters. According to Givoly and 
Lakonishok (1979), the selection of the revisions produced 
by the most active forecaster for each company (the one 
with the greatest number of revisions) as the representative 
of the group of forecasters. The most active forecaster is 
likely to specialise in the stock and be the first to respond 
to new information. Second, it would also be useful to 
investigate forecast accuracy by industry, thus further 
breaking down the sectors. It may be the case that different 
industries pose different forecasting problems for analysts. 
There may be significant differences in forecast errors for 
different industries and even for different firms within the 
same industry. In fact, there are analysts who focus their 
attention on specific industries and who release forecasts 
only for firms within those industries. As one would 
reasonably expect, “such specialisation would enable the 
analyst to focus their resources in a narrow area with 
the aim of producing more accurate forecasts” (Richards, 
1976, p.356). Third, one could find valuable the study of the 
correlation between broker/analyst ‘celebrity’ status or high 
survey ranking and their forecast accuracy. Fourth, taking 
into account the analysts’ historical forecast accuracy could 
also generate meaningful implications for deriving a robust 
consensus measure for forecasting EPS. Fifth, examining the 
forecast error by large brokers/analysts over that of the 
small brokers/analysts could produce important inferences 
for effective consensus construction. This could include, 
among other topics, the number of stocks covered by the 
analyst as well as the level of industry experience. Last but 
not least, the magnitude of the revision would be studied.   
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Sector Industry
Basic Materials Chemical Manufacturing, Chemicals – Plastics and Rubber, Containers and 
Packaging, Fabricated Plastic and Rubber, Forestry and Wood Products, Gold 
and Silver, Iron and Steel, Metal Mining, Non-Metallic Mining, Paper and Paper 
Products, Miscellaneous Fabricated Products.
Capital Goods Aerospace & Defence, Construction – Supplies & Fixtures, Construction and 
Agricultural Machinery, Construction – Raw Materials, Construction Services, 
Mobile Homes & RVs, Miscellaneous Capital Goods.
Cyclical Apparel and Accessories, Tools and Appliances, Audio and Video Equipment, 
Auto and Truck Manufacturers, Auto and Truck Parts, Footwear, Furniture and 
Fixtures, Jewellery and Silverware, Photography, Recreational Products, Non-
Apparel Textiles, Tires.
Energy Coal, Oil and Gas (Integrated), Oil and Gas Operations, Oil Well Services and 
Equipment.
Financials Consumer Financial Services, Insurance (Accident and Health, Life, Property and 
Casualty, Miscellaneous), Investment Services, Miscellaneous Financial Services, 
Money Centre Banks, Regional Banks, S&Ls/Savings Banks.
Health Biotechnology and Drugs, Healthcare Facilities, Major Drugs, Medical Equipment 
and Supplies.
Non-Cyclical Beverages (Alcoholic and Non-alcoholic), Crops, Fish and Livestock, Food 
Processing, Office Supplies, Personal and Household Prods, Tobacco.
Services Advertising, Broadcasting and Cable TV, Business Services, Casinos and Gaming, 
Communications Services, Hotels and Motels, Motion Pictures, Personal 
Services, Printing and Publishing, Printing Services, Real Estate Operations, 
Recreational Activities, Rental and Leasing, Restaurants, Retail (Apparel, 
Catalogue and Mail Order, Department and Discount, Drugs, Grocery, Specialty, 
Technology), Schools, Security Systems and Services, Waste Management 
Services.
Technology Communications Equipment, Computer Hardware, Computer Networks, 
Computer Peripherals, Computer Services, Computer Storage Devices, 
Electronic Instruments and Controls, Office Equipment, Scientific and Technical 
Instruments, Semiconductors, Software and Programming.
Transport Air Courier, Airline, Miscellaneous Transportation, Railroads, Trucking, Water 
Transportation.
Utilities Electric Utilities, Natural Gas Utilities, Water Utilities.
Appendix A. Industry Classification by Sector
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Appendix B. Calculating the Time-Weighted Consensus Estimate 
The time weighted estimate is calculated by multiplying the individual analyst estimate on the day by its respective weight. The 
older the estimate, the smaller its allocated weight. 
For example, if the last estimate by analyst A was $3.48 and was issued 56 days ago, then the weight assigned to this estimate 
= (100 – 56) / 100 = 0.44. 
The time weighted estimate for this day is obtained by multiplying an EPS estimate of $3.48 by its weight 0.44, which returns 
$1.53. 
Thus, in obtaining the consensus figure for the day, the 56 day old measure will be given less priority than a measure that is, for 
example, only 4 days old. 
In an attempt to avoid confusion, we provide the following scenario as an example. 
Analyst Estimate Age of Estimate Weight of Estimate
Analyst A $3.48 56 days old 0.44
Analyst B $3.45 4 days old 0.96
Analyst C $4.02 22 days old 0.78
Analyst D $4.15 103 days old 0
As mentioned in the paper, any analyst forecast that is more than 100 days old shall be considered too old, assigned the value 
of zero and is eliminated from the consensus calculation. Therefore, under the given scenario, the time weighted consensus 
figure for a given day is calculated in the following way: 
Step Task Example
1 Calculate the time 
weighted estimate for 
each analyst on the day
    Analyst A:  $3.48 × 0.44 = $1.53 
    Analyst B:  $3.45 × 0.96 = $3.31
    Analyst C:  $4.02 × 0.78 = $3.14
    Analyst D:  $4.15 × 0      = $0
2 Calculate the sum of the 
time weighted estimates 
for all analysts on the day
$1.53 + $3.31 + $3.14 + $0 = $7.98
3 Calculate the sum of 
weights of all analysts on 
the day
0.44 + 0.96 + 0.78 + 0 = 2.18
4 Calculate the time 
weighted consensus figure 
on the day
$7.98 / 2.18 = $3.66
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